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The purpose of this work is to present different ways of implementing two-factor authentica-
tion for an online biobank system and implement one such system both on the server side 
and as a mobile application. 
First the threats against medical systems are presented showing the reasoning for greater 
security. The type of information stored in these systems and the desirability of the infor-
mation for attackers is explained. General legislation is presented by examples from the 
United States of America as well as Finland. 
Then the possible authentication methods and basic cryptography are explained. The cho-
sen implementation is shown with the algorithms used. 
The work succeeded in implementing the system using time-based one-time passwords as 
presented in existing work but extending it by using newer cryptographic methods and longer 
passwords to enhance the security even further. A few further enhancements are explained 
that could be implemented in the future. 
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Työn tarkoitus on esittää toteutusvaihtoehtoja kaksivaiheiseen autentikointiin 
verkkopohjaisessa biopankkijärjestelmässä ja toteuttaa yksi näistä sekä palvelinpuolella että 
mobiiliapplikaationa. 
Ensin esitellään lääketieteellisten järjestelmien uhkia sekä syitä parempaan turvallisuuteen 
johtuen talletettavien tietojen arkaluonteisuudesta sekä tietojen kiinnostavuudesta 
hyökkääjille. Aiheeseen liittyvää lainsäädäntöä käydään läpi Suomen ja Amerikan 
Yhdysvaltojen osalta. 
Mahdollisia autentikaatiotapoja selitetään sekä annetaan perustietoja kryptografisista 
menetelmistä. Esitetään valittu toteutus ja käytetyt algoritmit. 
Kertakäyttöiset salasanat toteutettiin aikapohjaisina aiemmin esitettyjen määritelmien 
mukaisesti, mutta käyttäen uudempia kryptografisia menetelmiä ja pitempiä salasanoja 
parantaen turvallisuutta entisestään. Muutamia mahdollisia jatkokehitysaiheita esitetään. 
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Abbreviations 
OTP One-Time Password. A password that is valid only once. 
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm. A family of hashing algorithms used to determine 
the authenticity of a message, or other piece of data. 
TRNG True Random Number Generator. A source for aperiodic and nondetermin-
istic random numbers 
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator. A source for numbers that try to be 
random, but are deterministic and periodic. 
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code. A method for calculating a 
code for authenticating messages based on a hash algorithm. 
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology. A governmental 
agency that develops and applies technology, measurements, and stand-
ards in the United States of America. 
FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  A governmental agency in The United 
States of America responsible for public health, including medical systems 
and products. 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Legislation that han-
dles health insurances, fraud and stipulates industry-wide standards in The 
United States. 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard. A specification for encryption of electronic 
data defined by NIST.
 ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security. A European 
Union agency for cyber security. 
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1 Introduction 
Medical practitioners and researchers handle a lot of sensitive data on individuals in their 
work. These data are meant to be used only in the treatment of the patient and ensuring 
their wellbeing or, in the case of research, to create new treatments or ensure the efficacy 
of existing ones. Doctors have a need to keep specific records of the individuals and their 
health history, but researchers usually can handle the data as anonymized without infor-
mation on who the actual individual behind the information or samples is. 
Historically medical data were kept on paper in records and anyone who had access to 
the storage room could access them. There was no audit trail on who had read, modified 
or even deleted information from the records. The information was also only in one place, 
unless copies were made, but even in that case any possible additions or corrections 
were not available to others. 
Nowadays medical records are kept increasingly as electronic records which allows easy 
access regardless of location. The information can be kept up to date and shared be-
tween healthcare providers. This creates new challenges for security and allows a whole 
new way for attackers to attempt to attain the information. There is no need to physically 
break into a hospital record storage, all that is needed is a vulnerable system connected 
to a network. 
The reasons for attacking medical systems vary. Some may be attacking any system 
they can get into, some may be searching for specific information and some may be 
looking for a way to make money by blackmail. There have been cases of taking control 
of the servers and demanding money for releasing control and the media are very inter-
ested in any private information about public figures. 
The records also contain other information than medical data: credit card information, 
social security numbers, insurance details and many other information that can be used 
to the attacker’s advantage [22]. With enough information identity theft or insurance fraud 
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is possible and may cause huge problems to the individuals before it is discovered. Prov-
ing these cases may also be very difficult. Also if patients don’t trust their doctors and 
clinics to keep their private information safe they might not want to volunteer information 
that might be critical for their proper care. This may also affect information gathered for 
research or assessing the state of public health. 
Due to all this the regular methods for logging in based on a username and a password 
may not be enough to ensure the confidentiality of the data. The authentication must be 
made stronger to ensure that only the authorized people are allowed access to the data 
in the system. 
A multinational company provides services in the biobank and medical information sys-
tem sector. They produce online services which allow the storage, retrieval, anonymiza-
tion and research services for a variety of medical service providers. Due to the nature 
of the data, customers and the system being available online they need to have strong 
user authentication and data protection. Their current system has a regular one-factor 
login system with username and password and a possibility to have a second factor 
authentication via SMS. Using SMS as the second factor is seen both expensive and 
cumbersome so another way of providing enhanced security for user authentication is 
needed. 
The goal of this thesis is to devise a two-factor authentication system for this company. 
There are several two-factor authentication methods available so the purpose is not to 
create a completely new method. Basic principles of cryptography, examples of two-
factor authentication methods and an implementation of one method will be presented. 
The system will be based on one-time passwords, which are commonly used in providing 
a second factor authentication from social media to online banking. The choice is due to 
these methods being well tested and proven effective as well as easy to use. Other pos-
sible methods for second factor authentication are also discussed and the reasons for 
not using them are explained. 
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The system will be built as a two-tier application. Mobile applications will handle the user-
side creation of token and server application will handle authentication into the service. 
First the current state of security in medical systems is presented and then the types of 
attacks happening on these systems. The different ways of authentication are explained 
and some history of cryptography as well as basics of cryptography is given. Then the 
implementation is explained and a short analysis to its strength and conclusions about 
the work is presented. 
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2 Security in Medical Systems 
User authentication and data security are complex problems affecting all areas of com-
puting. It is needed from the everyday social media all the way to banking, medical infor-
mation, and state secrets. We are constantly required to authenticate ourselves in one 
way or another and require the same from others. We have locks in our doors to let 
ourselves in and keep others out. At work we recognize each other automatically and 
can be suspicious if a stranger suddenly walks in the office. We are given passwords 
and PIN codes to access our bank accounts and other services. All this requires authen-
tication and verification of the user. 
Not all of the systems we authenticate to are overly important. If someone gets hold of 
someone else’s password to a video rental company they may be able to see what some-
one has watched and maybe get their bonus points but not much more. Accessing a 
hobby forum for crocheting may be a nuisance and allow spamming but not cause any 
bigger issues. 
Some of the systems are a lot more important. Accessing our social media profiles may 
allow defamation, finding out private information and causing many issues in social life, 
maybe even in professional capacity. If someone gets access to our bank account they 
may be able to take all our money, apply for loans, and other serious things. If they 
access our medical records they may get very personal information or maybe even affect 
the treatment we get the next time we go to the hospital. It could even be life threatening 
if a fatal allergy information is altered. 
We also use some of the systems to log in to other systems. This makes it even more 
important to keep those systems private and only accessible to ourselves. 
In the medical field a lot of sensitive and personal information is gathered. This infor-
mation may include diseases, health concerns, treatment plans, family history, psycho-
logical evaluations and many other things. The access to this information should be re-
stricted to those who really need it and there should be no reason for users to access 
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every kind of information. They should only be able to access the information that is 
required for them to do their jobs. [24] 
In research users often handle large amounts of personal data. They don’t usually need 
access to all of the personal data, only subsets of it. For example, doing tests on samples 
taken from a group of people may require information on the age, gender, race and if the 
person is a smoker. Very rarely would there be need to know the names, addresses and 
other information for the donors of the samples. This also makes the research much 
easier since the rules for handling anonymized data are much more relaxed than those 
governing the use of full personal data. [25] 
2.1 Basic Security 
All database systems should have security in place to protect their contents, but when 
the databases contain medical or personal information this becomes a strict requirement. 
The security measures that have to be in place vary depending on the customer and 
country where the service is provided. Every country has different legislation and every 
customer may have different views on how the data should be handled and presented. 
For any given database there are certain basic security measures that should be in place. 
The users must be authenticated to make sure only authorized people are given access 
to the system. The users must only be authorized to see, modify or add data that they 
are entitled to. If a person is doing statistics of all visitors in a hospital they should not 
have any access to names or medical history of the users, and a nurse taking blood 
samples does not need to know about the psychiatric therapy the patient is going through 
unless it relates to the blood test. [27] 
For every action taken in the system there needs to be an audit trail recorded. Every user 
accessing any information must be recorded and be verified in a way that cannot be 
altered afterwards. The audit trail must be detailed enough to have information on which 
data were accessed, not only which user accessed whose information. This allows any-
one to validate that nobody has accessed information without a proper cause. [26] 
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In addition to these basic principles there are other things to consider when creating an 
information system. How are the users allowed to log in? What kind of passwords are 
acceptable to use? How often should they be changed? How to make sure the users 
remember the passwords and don’t just write them down next to the machine? What 
access should an administrator have to the system? Should the administrator have ac-
cess to other user accounts? How are digital signatures handled in the system? 
2.2 Requirements by FDA 
If a system is to be used in The United States there are guidelines to meet. Some sys-
tems and devices have stricter requirements than others but it is always good to strive 
to provide the largest coverage of the requirements, even if it is not legally required. 
The Food and Drug Administration has several guidelines for information systems used 
in the medical field. For example, the 21 CFR part 11 dictates requirements for electronic 
signatures, including the following: [4] 
 each signature must be unique to the user 
 user must be verified by the organization providing the signature 
 there must be at least two identification components, such as identification code and 
password, if the signature is not based on biometrics 
 only the owner of the ID code and password may use them 
 no two users may have the same combination of identification components 
 possible passwords should be revised periodically 
 attempts to use identification components, such as trying to log into a user’s account 
with an incorrect password, must be detected and acted upon 
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2.3 Legislation in Finland 
There is a lot of legislation concerning medical procedures, records, and their use in 
Finland. Access to this kind of information must be restricted to only those people who 
require the information and only partial information should be available if there is no rea-
son to have the whole patient history. This means that, for example, if a person comes 
in for an x-ray of the foot the radiographer should not have access to any information 
about the patient’s possible earlier medical history that is not relevant to the foot injury. 
Electronic patient records must have user access restrictions that allow all information 
and functionality to be restricted based on the user. The users must be authenticated 
and every user must use a separate account. [10] 
If the records include psychiatric or hereditary information that part must be protected 
with a separate permission request system if the records are to be used in other medical 
fields. This request does not apply to possible medication information or possible critical 
risk information. [10] 
When services are outsourced to another entity the requirements must be upheld also 
at the provider and a written contract must exist between the entities describing all re-
quirements for security. [10] 
Every service provider in social services and medical fields must gather a log of all ac-
tivities regarding stored information. The log must include identification of the data that 
were accessed, which service provider accessed them, which provider’s data were ac-
cessed, why they were accessed and when. This log information must be destroyed 
when they are no longer pertinent for making sure all data are accessed according to the 
law. [11] There is however a minimum time of 12 years for which the log information must 
be stored securely. [10, 24 §] 
All documents must include a digital signature to ensure their immutability and authen-
ticity. When a person is signing the documents there are several requirements for the 
used method to be legally valid: 
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 The method must be based on an initial identification, which is done in person by 
checking identity documents (passport, personal ID card) [12, 17 §] 
 There must be a log about the initial identification including required information to 
verify the identification, what documents were used, possible limitations, and, when 
using a certificate, information about the certificate authority, whose certificate it is, a 
unique identifier for the owner and certificate itself, validity period and an electronic 
signature [12, 19 § / 24 §] 
 It must be possible to uniquely identify the person in possession of the identification 
item 
 It must be possible to verify that only the person holding the identification item can 
use it 
 The method is secure enough considering current threats against the used technol-
ogy [12, 8 §] 
Also the providers of authentication services must be trustworthy, which means that all 
their personnel must be of age, they must not be bankrupt and they may not have any 
other limitations to their actions. They also may not have a conviction for incarceration 
within the past five years, or even fined within the past three years for a crime that would 
make them unsuitable for work in authentication services. [12 9 §] 
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3 Attacks on Medical Systems 
3.1 Attack Prevalence 
Many medical systems have been attacked in the past and the attacks will surely just get 
more common since the digitalization of information provides more and more possibili-
ties. In some places records are still on paper in cardboard folders and acquiring them 
requires physical entry but more and more of these are transferred to electronic systems 
and can be accessed from anywhere. In the United States in 2008 only 9% of hospitals 
had electronic health records in use whereas in 2014 the figure had gone up to 75%. [28] 
The year 2016 has been deemed as the “year of data security” in healthcare, at least 
partially due to the issues that happened in 2015. The U.S. based Ponemon Institute 
specializing in research on privacy and data protection released a report stating that 
more than 90 percent of healthcare organizations (HCs) in their study had a data breach 
and more than 40 percent had more than five data breaches during the past two years. 
The study included 90 “covered entities” meaning “health plans, health care clearing-
houses and health care providers who transmit any health information electronically” as 
well as 88 “business associates” (BAs) defined as “a person or entity that performs ser-
vices for a covered entity that involves the use or disclosure of protected health infor-
mation.” [19] 
According to the report criminal attacks are a major cause for the information breaches 
and are up 125% compared to five years ago [19]. If records were electronic and en-
crypted this could be mitigated, but it is impossible to have everything converted to elec-
tronic records immediately, if ever. Then again, using electronic records will have another 
set of problems and possibilities for attacks. 
The report further states that web-borne malware attacks caused issues for 78% of HC 
organizations and 82% of the BAs. 65% of HC organizations and 87% of BAs experi-
enced electronic information-based security incidents over the past two years. What is 
surprising and concerning is that still only 40% of the HC organizations and 35% of the 
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BAs are concerned about cyber-attacks. Over half of them say they don’t have enough 
budget and resources to counter these attacks. [19] 
The most worrying security threats listed in the report amongst the HC organizations 
were employee negligence, cyber attackers, use of public cloud services, mobile device 
insecurity, and “bring your own device” activity (70%, 40%, 33%, 32%, and 29% respec-
tively of respondents). The most reported incidents in the HC organizations were lost or 
stolen devices, spear phishing, web-borne malware attacks, exploits, and SQL attacks 
(96%, 88%, 78%, 54%, and 38% respectively). Many of these could be handled with 
proper information system planning and development. [19] 
The Ponemon report shows that the types and amounts of attacks have changed drasti-
cally in the recent years. Previously the most attacks were through loss or theft, or other 
traditional methods. As shown in Table 1 in 2015 the attacks moved strongly to the elec-
tronic world and affected almost hundred times more people. Most of the individuals af-
fected were also in only a few major attacks, like Premera Blue Cross and Anthem hacks 
which leaked 11 and 78.8 million customer records respectively. [22] 
Medical identity theft in The United States has nearly doubled to 2.3 million adult victims 
between 2009 and 2014. [19]  
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Type of Breach Individuals Affected 
2014 
Individuals Affected 
2015 
Hacking or IT Incident 1,768,630 111,803,342 
Loss or Theft 7,237,157 750,802 
Other 3,504350 646,243 
Total Affected 12,564,137 113,200,387 
Table 1 Individuals affected by attacks in 2014 and 2015 [22] 
3.2 Reasons for Attacks 
The reasons for attacks are not usually to acquire medical information of individuals but 
to enable the attackers to use the information to either gain access to other systems or 
be able to claim to be another person. Identity theft and insurance fraud are possible with 
the information that is held in medical information system records. Attackers may be able 
to even acquire medical equipment or medicine by claiming to be someone else. These 
can then be sold for profit. [23] 
A single credit card number may be worth $1 to attackers, but health credentials can be 
sold for up to $10 each based on information gathered from the underground exchanges 
by PhishLabs, a cybercrime protection company. [23] 
12 
 
 
3.3 Ransomware Attacks 
There have been attacks known as ransomware attacks to hospital systems where the 
attacker encrypts everything with their own key and asks for the target to pay to get the 
key. [18] If the systems are properly backed up this might not be needed and the systems 
can be restored without issues but the attacker still succeeded to penetrate the system. 
Sometimes the hospitals even have to pay since they do not have proper backups in 
place. [20] 
3.4 Cost of an Attack 
The average cost for a single stolen patient record is 154 USD and for HC organizations 
it can be as high as 363 USD [19]. Since one attack can easily compromise thousands 
of records the costs rise quite quickly to very large sums.  
The Ponemon study estimates that the cost of data breaches in the U.S. is around $6 
billion to the whole industry and the average cost of a data breach was $2.1 million for 
the healthcare organizations. For the business associates a breach cost on average $1 
million. This clearly shows that security is important not only to protect the people whose 
information is being handled but also to protect investments and businesses. [19] 
Many victims of medical identity theft report the cost of $13500 on average to restore 
their credit and reimburse HC providers for fraudulent claims. Still almost two-thirds of 
the HC organizations and BAs have no protection services for their customers whose 
information has been compromised. [19] 
3.5 Assumption of Safety 
Encryption and security is used as a sales technique by many companies. Healthcare 
providers may not have enough knowledge of security internally so they trust the provid-
ers in their promises of security. Sometimes the advertising can be very misleading and 
cause even federal cases to be filed. 
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Henry Schein Practice Solutions, a leading provider of dental practice office manage-
ment software, marketed their system as compliant to the HIPAA requirements for patient 
data encryption but actually used a simpler method than the required AES cryptography. 
The company had to pay $250,000 in fines and notify all their customers that their system 
does not provide the advertised security required by HIPAA. 
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4 Authentication Methods 
4.1 Available Methods 
There are several methods to authenticate a user into a system. In addition to the most 
common username and password combination, additional methods can be used to verify 
the authenticity of the user. Some of the methods can be used beforehand, for example 
username and password, and some are used to monitor the user while using the system. 
[5] 
Transaction authentication requires additional data to compare to the actions of the users 
at the moment and might cause false positives. Banks use this method to track transac-
tions. For example, if a person’s credit card is suddenly being used at a location distant 
from the owner’s place of living the bank can monitor the transactions and contact the 
card owner to make sure the card is not misused. [5] 
Biometrics includes fingerprints, retina scans, voice recognition, and face recognition. 
Voice recognition is the only simple method possible to use remotely without any addi-
tional hardware, but it might be possible to fake by recording voice and might suffer from 
problems with phone line quality. [5] 
Tokens are physical devices used by themselves or with a username/password authen-
tication. Tokens are often used in buildings to allow people through restricted access 
areas. They can also be electronic devices, such as one-time password generators. A 
key to one’s house or car is also a simple token. [5] 
Multi-factor authentication is a combination of two or more authentication methods. Usu-
ally methods from different categories are chosen to enhance security. The groups in-
clude something known (password), something possessed (token), and something in-
herent (fingerprint). [5] 
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Out-of-band authentication uses a completely separate system to authenticate the user. 
For example, while logging in via the Internet the user gets a second verification via SMS 
or a phone call. [5] 
4.2 Token Authentication 
Token authentication is a simple system with variable security and efficiency. The sim-
plest token is a key or electronic badge that the user uses to gain access to the system. 
Usually this works mainly in physical things like buildings and vehicles. If the key has 
been designed to be safe the system may be safe. However, the key may be easy to 
copy after seeing one or one key might fit several buildings or vehicles. It is not possible 
to provide access to someone else without physically giving them the key or a copy of 
one. In information systems external hardware is also required to use them. 
Sometimes tokens require a PIN code to use them, for example bank cards or smart-
cards used to log in to computers. This provides another layer of security to just acquiring 
the token, or a copy of one. A fingerprint scan may also be used in addition to an access 
badge to get into buildings. 
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4.3 Username/Password Authentication 
The most used authentication method is username and password. This may seem to 
contain two pieces of identification data, but only one of them is usually known only to 
the user. As seen in Picture 1 in many systems the usernames may be shown to other 
users, or is the user’s email address, so practically only the password is used for authen-
tication. 
If the user’s password is compromised anyone can log in to the system imposing as the 
user. If the original user detects this they may change their password and force the im-
postor out. The impostor could also change the password, or set up a secondary pass-
word retrieval method within the system which allows them access at a later time. 
Picture 1 On Twitter the usernames are shown to everyone 
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Many systems show the user little or no information about their past actions so they may 
not even realize their account is being used by someone else. Some systems have in-
formation about last access time, but it might not be clearly visible or the users don’t 
check it. Others may send a message at least when a login is detected from a new device 
or location. Picture 2 shows the Facebook login history giving the possibility of checking 
whether someone else has accessed the account. 
 
Passwords can be made to expire after a certain age. This will help in a situation where 
someone else is using the password without the user’s knowledge. The impostor will 
have to find out the new password before being able to log in to the system. Many times 
passwords age quite rarely, since it would be inconvenient to memorize a new password 
all the time and would cause the users to either write down the passwords or use a very 
similar password to the previous one. 
Strong passwords are very often promoted, but usually in a false way. The common 
misconception is that a strong password must contain numbers, capital letters, special 
characters etc. This will make it hard for the users to remember, which will cause them 
to write it down and make it an attack point. Much better passwords are for example long 
sequences of words that the user can make into a story and remember, maybe with 
some letter/number substitutions. 
Picture 3 presents a famous example of this technique is presented as an xkcd comic. 
Picture 2 Facebook last login history 
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Picture 3 xkcd comic #936 promoting secure passwords 
Another suggested strong password method is to use a single gibberish part which the 
user can memorize and add to that something different for each place where the pass-
word is used. This way it will be unique, but easier to remember. 
4.4 Two-Factor Authentication 
4.4.1 Definition 
Two-factor authentication employs a second method to authenticate the user, usually in 
addition to the username/password pair, some of which were introduced earlier in this 
section. The second factor must be something variable or something that has to be phys-
ically obtained.  
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By using a second factor in authentication the user’s identity is still safe even if an im-
postor finds out their password. This still doesn’t mean that the user can be careless 
about their password. If it is revealed to others, the two-factor authentication becomes 
just one-factor authentication and no additional security is present. 
4.4.2 Two-Factor Using SMS 
Using SMS as a second factor authentication is actually both out-of-band and two-factor 
since the second piece of information is relayed via a different route than the password 
is sent. This method also allows only the person who has access to the device receiving 
the messages to log in, so partially fits into the something possessed category. However, 
sometimes SMS is sent also to other devices; for example, if the user is using Apple 
iPhone and has message delivery set up the SMS might also be transmitted to another 
device linked to the user’s Apple account that may be in the possession of an impostor. 
There is also another attack vector via the security of the servers handling the SMS 
transmitting to these other devices. 
Sending messages via the mobile network also imposes some costs, at least to the 
sender, and mobile networks are not always available. Even in larger cities there may be 
areas where mobile coverage for some operator is poor, or the user might be in a base-
ment as many laboratories are. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology has recently deemed two-factor au-
thentication based on phone or SMS as deprecated and will not consider using them as 
secure or advisable in the future. [29] 
4.4.3 Two-Factor Using Pre-Generated Passwords 
Many banks use a pre-generated set of passwords as the second factor authentication 
online. The passwords are printed out and they may be used sequentially or randomly. 
They may also be one-time or multiple-use passwords. Usually the password sheets will 
expire after a given time regardless of their use. 
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One method of generating these passwords is using a counter-based one-time password 
algorithm. This way the server does not need the whole password sheet and only needs 
to keep track of the secret key and the current counter value. 
The major problem with these password sheets is obvious: if an attacker can have ac-
cess to the sheet even once, they can copy the contents and log in any time after that 
using the constant pre-generated passwords. If the passwords are used sequentially, the 
user may keep track of which password is next and notice if there is a discrepancy. If 
they are used randomly, and especially multiple times, the user has no way of knowing 
if someone else has used their account with these passwords. 
In addition to this problem the password sheets must be given to the user securely. This 
may cause extra costs and trouble compared to some more secure methods. 
Regardless of these issues this method is used for example by major Nordic banks. In 
their case the login has actually three parts of secret information: login ID, password and 
the password sheet. Nobody else should know any of these, since banking is completely 
private service as opposed to collaborative services where the user’s login name may 
be visible to others. 
4.4.4 Two-Factor Using One-Time Password 
One-time passwords are usually retrieved from devices without any connection to any 
network so they will work everywhere. There are specialized devices that only give out 
passwords and there are also applications for multifunction devices. The former may be 
more secure since to get any data out of it the attacker has to disassemble the device. 
Using mobile applications it is theoretically possible to get data out of the device via other 
installed applications or security holes in the operating system. Therefore the OTP ap-
plication has to take these into consideration. 
Special devices have to be present when the user logs in so they add to the items the 
person has to take care of. Users usually have mobile phones with them anyway so using 
an application doesn’t require carrying anything extra. Also the application can be easily 
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updated and changed, unlike a hardware solution and is a lot cheaper to produce and 
distribute. 
One-time passwords are generated with a function that takes a secret key and some 
variable that causes the result to be different each time. The secret must be known to 
both sides of the authentication and is the weak point. It must never be disclosed to 
anyone and preferably even the user shouldn’t know it. [2] 
The algorithm used to generate the passwords may or may not be public. Usually the 
algorithms are public since it helps determine their strength and possible weak points. 
An authentication method should be strong based on its algorithm and secret keys, not 
based on obscurity, i.e. nobody knowing how it is generated. The same applies for phys-
ical locks: they are patented and usually anyone can get a hold of the patent to read how 
it works. The difficulty is in creating keys that would fit that specific lock you want to open. 
There are two main types of one-time passwords in use currently: counter and time 
based [2, 3]. Counter based method uses an incrementing counter as the input and time 
based uses the current time. Counter based methods may get out of sync if the user 
requests passwords but doesn’t input them. This causes the requirement of resynchro-
nization between the server and the generator. Time-based generator has no such prob-
lems, but it requires both sides to have synchronized clocks. This is usually no problem 
since mobile phones synchronize their clocks automatically, as do servers. 
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5 History of Cryptography 
The field of cryptography is a very old one. It could be said that in the beginning just 
writing something down was a type of cryptography since very few people could read or 
write. Still anyone who learned to read and write could have access to these messages 
so normal language and writing systems didn’t provide a proper way of hiding the infor-
mation. 
5.1 Ancient Encryptions 
Almost four thousand years ago in Egypt some scribes used hieroglyphs differently to try 
to conceal the text from others who did not know the key to the writing. In ancient Greece 
texts were written on a long tape wound around a stick and the recipient had to have the 
same width stick to “decode” the text. Ancient Romans used the Caesar Shift cipher 
which shifts the letters up by a certain amount, usually three. This way A became D, F 
became I and X became A. Reading the message back required moving every letter 
back by the agreed amount. 
Especially the two latter methods are very inefficient. There are only so many thick-
nesses of sticks or numbers of shifts one can choose from so the message can be de-
crypted very quickly using brute force method, meaning just trying every combination 
and seeing which one fits. 
A bit more secure way to switch letters around would be to randomly select correspond-
ing letter pairs. Then A might be R, F might be B and X might be Y. This way the attacker 
would have to try on average 
  !
 
 combinations, which is already 2 ∗10   possibilities. 
However, there are attack methods to reduce this complexity. For example, in English 
language the most common letter is E so the attacker has to count how many times each 
letter is present in the encrypted text and can guess that the most common should be 
replaced with E. Apply this to a few of the most common letters and the message may 
start to unravel. This technique is called frequency analysis. 
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Also it is possible to assume that any letter by itself is probably A since there are no other 
single-letter words in the English language. Also two-letter words are probably some of 
the most common, like if, of, to, an, in, on and so on. With this information it is quite 
feasible to decrypt simple character substitution encryptions. 
5.2 Middle Ages 
In the Middle Ages many states had ambassadors in different countries and it was im-
portant to send and receive messages without the information getting into the wrong 
hands. One of the used technologies was to switch the cipher mid message, for example 
after every four words, to make it harder to use any frequency analysis on the whole 
message. 
In the early 1900s a nearly unbreakable invention was made: the one-time pad. This 
technique has a list of ciphers that are used only once and never again. If the enemy 
decrypts one message they have no possibility to decrypt the next one since the cipher 
has changed and will not be used again in any of the future messages. By itself of course 
this is not enough to ensure the message wouldn’t be decrypted. The encryption tech-
nique itself must also be of sufficient strength to make brute force decryption infeasible. 
5.3 Modern Times 
An interesting way of cryptography was to use Navajo Indians during the World War II to 
send messages. Their language was not known to others, so they could send messages 
in their own language and translate them in the other end. This, of course, goes more 
into the “security by obscurity” category and is not really a cryptographic method, but 
was still very successful during the war and wasn’t broken at the time. 
Also used in the World War II was the German Enigma machine. It consisted of several 
rotating disks that would change position on every character and depending on the start-
ing conditions would produce a strongly secure varying output. The British tried to break 
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the code for a long time and finally Alan Turing built a machine that could calculate sev-
eral combinations at the same time and would possibly brute force the code. Even that 
didn’t work by itself due to the amount of different combinations. 
While analyzing some messages the British had managed to decipher they noticed that 
many messages were regular. Some weather reports always contained predictable in-
formation. Some messages always had predictable text in them, for example “heil Hitler” 
in the end. With this knowledge they could make the machine try different combinations 
until it found the known text and then use that key to decipher any message sent before 
a key change happened. This kind of attack is called known plaintext attack. 
The actual modern cryptographic methods use a mathematical method and a key or a 
set of keys to encrypt the message. Their strength is in the algorithm and the number of 
possible key combinations used. They can utilize a single key to encrypt and decrypt or 
they can use separate keys, often called public key cryptography. It can be used in two 
ways: if the message is encrypted with the private key then anyone who has the public 
key can decrypt it and be sure that the only person having the private key wrote it. It can 
also be used by anyone having the public key to encrypt a message and then only the 
person with the private key can decrypt it. 
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6 Cryptography Basics 
6.1 Strong and Weak Cryptography 
In cryptography the terms strong and weak are used often. The meaning is not simple 
and an algorithm deemed strong may suddenly become weak after new attacks or de-
vices are designed. Therefore nothing can be said to be strong forever, only for the time 
being. 
If a cryptographic system is strong, it means it is hard to break. An encrypted message 
should be very hard, or preferably theoretically impossible, to decrypt without the proper 
key. For a hash function it should be hard or impossible to find a different message m’ 
that produces the same hash value as another message m. 
One simple value to determine the strength of an algorithm is the number of bits used in 
the key. If an algorithm uses 4 bits in a key there are only 2  = 16 possible keys. If testing 
one key takes one second, we will on average find the correct key in 8 seconds. If an 
algorithm uses 64 bits, we will have to test on average 2   = 4294967296 keys, taking 
136 years at the mentioned speed. 
Of course computers and especially dedicated hardware can test keys a lot faster and 
the speed depends on the algorithm used. The simplest algorithm is exclusive-or which 
is implemented in hardware on practically every processor available and therefore is very 
easy and fast to implement. Usually it is only used as a part of the algorithm and the 
whole algorithm consists of more complicated mathematics. 
For the SHA256 algorithm used in this work the calculation takes about 12 clock cycles 
per byte from a regular Intel/AMD desktop processor when messages are at least 576 
bytes long. [17] For shorter messages the initialization overhead causes more cycles, 
but the absolute time is of course shorter. This speed means that with a message of 
4096 bytes it would take 49152 clock cycles to try out one key. Given a four-core pro-
cessor running at 3.5GHz this would mean that 284830 keys could be tested per second. 
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Therefore the 64bit key length would cause an average calculation time of only four hours 
on one machine and in the worst case only eight hours. This obviously makes the algo-
rithm weak. 
If we use 256bit key, we will require on average 2    = 2.4 ∗10   tries. This on the given 
desktop computer would take 2   times more, resulting in a calculation time of 3.3 ∗10   
years. This means that even by using an army of computers a brute force guessing 
method is not in general usable to break this algorithm. 
Specialized hardware can of course try out keys even faster but considering the time 
values in question even a speedup of a billion wouldn’t help to find a key in a reasonable 
time. 
6.2 Governmental Recommendations 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lists algorithms that should 
or shouldn’t be used, their comparable strength based on key sizes, how often keys 
should be changed and other important information. [16] 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) has a similar 
report for recommendations on cryptographic algorithms and key sizes. In the 2014 re-
port they recommend SHA-2 family for future use, as long as at least 256bit version is 
used. The SHA224 version is not recommended since it has less than the recommended 
minimum of 128 bits of security. [15] 
Other recommended hashing algorithms are SHA-3 (with at least 256 bits) and Whirlpool. 
[15] 
The HMAC algorithm is deemed safe for future use also but since it can use several hash 
functions internally the actual algorithm must be chosen properly. HMAC-SHA1 and 
HMAC-MD5 should not be used in any new implementation due to the insecurity of the 
hash algorithms. [15] 
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6.3 Security by Obscurity 
A common problem in cryptography or other security is to rely on security by obscurity. 
This means that the details of the encryption or other security methods are not disclosed 
and trust is in the difficulty of finding out this information. This does not provide good 
security, since when the method is found out, it may not be very strong and can be cir-
cumvented easily. It can be related to using a special hiding place for a key to your house 
and trusting no outsiders will know where to find it. 
Regularly used cryptography methods are publicly explained and anyone can analyze 
them. This way the strength relies on an actually proven method and usually only the 
keys must be kept secret. This also means that anyone can try to devise a method for 
calculating the encryption or decryption values faster than before. 
6.4 Encryption vs Hashing 
Many times people talk about encryption when they are actually using hashing. Hashing 
is a cryptographic method, but it is very different from encryption in usage and function. 
Both methods use keys to ensure authenticity and/or secrecy but in a different way. [30] 
Encryption is taking a message M and using some function F to produce a message M’. 
There always exists a function F’ that can be used to convert M’ back into M. This means 
that encryption is a two-way function and can be used to hide or secure information from 
others. [30] 
Hashing is taking a message M and using some function F to produce a hash H, usually 
of a small size compared to the message. The operation is one-way, meaning there is 
no inverse function F’ that would produce M from H. There may also be many Ms that 
produce the exact same H. There are ways to try to infer the original message, or any of 
the messages that would produce a certain hash, but the hash function and its applica-
tions should make this very hard. Hashing is used for example to make sure a document 
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is not tampered with in-transit since altering it would make the hash result not match the 
one sent with it. [30] 
6.5 Hash Functions 
Hash functions are used to transform variable sized input data into a usually fixed size 
output [6]. The output is shorter in length than the input and can be used for example to 
verify the authenticity of the input or to search values in a large dataset faster. Since the 
input is variable and output is fixed size, several input values will produce the same out-
put value. This is called a collision and means that unlike compression or encryption 
methods hash values are not reversible. [31] 
Hash functions need to have certain features to be considered strong: 
 Uniform distribution, which means that for any given input, any output value is as 
probable as another. This reduces collisions and makes the function less predictable. 
[32] 
 Avalanche effect, which means that when any input bit changes, the probability for 
any output bit to change is 0.5. This makes the function less predictable and finding 
a collision much harder. [32] 
It is important to reduce the probability of a collision. If an attacker finds a way to produce 
a collision, they can find another input data that produces the same output as another. If 
the hash function is used to provide a digital signature, the attacker can change the input 
data into another and still produce the same output. If this happens the hash function is 
not suitable for digital signatures and must be discarded. [32] 
If the hash function is used in providing faster search results inside large datasets the 
consequences of collisions are not as drastic as for digital signatures. In search hash 
functions data is usually divided into sections based on the hash function and several 
input data will produce the same output regularly. The hash function is not used to vali-
date the data, only to find in which section the data resides. If the hash function produces 
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collisions more often, the only adverse result is that more data is saved in certain sec-
tions and finding it takes more time. [33] 
Even if a hash function is considered safe when introduced, it may be found lacking later 
on. MD5 is one algorithm that was very widely used, but later on cryptanalysis found 
ways to produce collisions on demand and the algorithm is very fast so brute force at-
tacks are feasible. SHA-1 algorithm was also previously a standard but is now depre-
cated. Old implementations may still rely on these algorithms, but all new applications 
must use other hash functions. [34] 
6.5.1 SHA Family 
In 1995 the National Institute of Standards and Technology defined a Secure Hash Al-
gorithm 1 that provides hashing of any data into a 160bit result. The algorithm was widely 
used but it has also been proven to have possible collision problems. Therefore in 2001 
a new family of hash functions were defined in Secure Hash Standard [1]. These are 
called SHA-2 and contain such algorithms as SHA-256 and SHA-512. They provide 
larger output values, which has to be taken into account when implementing methods 
using them. 
6.5.2 SHA256 Algorithm 
The SHA256 algorithm is a hash function that has internal state of eight 32bit words and 
operates on blocks of 512 bits each. Each block is run through 64 cycles of the mathe-
matical formula and each time a different constant is used. The end result will be the 
concatenation of this internal state to produce a 256bit hash value. [1] 
Currently there are no known actual attacks against the SHA256 algorithm, but theoret-
ical weaknesses are being assessed and some possible problems have been identified, 
like preimage resistance (when value x hashed produces the same value x), which might 
make it easier to find collisions for the algorithm. [14] 
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6.5.3 SHA512 Algorithm 
The SHA512 algorithm is similar to the SHA256 algorithm but operates on eight 64bit 
words internally, running the algorithm 80 times and producing a 512bit hash value. The 
apparent security strength of the algorithm is twice that of SHA256 and should be used 
when better security is required. [1] 
The algorithm has the same theoretical attacks as the SHA256 algorithm, but due to 
more cycles it is more secure. 
6.6 Hash-Based Message Authentication Code 
A hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) is a way of generating an authen-
tication code for any sized data to verify its authenticity. The algorithm requires a hashing 
function (like MD5 or SHA256) for operation. The main algorithm is      ( ,  )=
 ((  ⊕     )||  ((  ⊕     )||  )), where H is the has function, m is the message, K is 
the secret key, || is concatenation operator and ⊕  is exclusive-or operator. Constants opad 
and ipad are outer and inner padding values consisting of repeating bytes of 0x5c and 
0x36 respectively. [13] 
When applied to the message the algorithm will generate a single hash value as a result. 
The value will be different if the message or the key is changed. To validate its authen-
ticity the secret key must be known. 
The reason why there are two hashes inside each other is because for a single hash of 
type  (  || ) there might be a way to find a message m2 that provides the same initial 
conditions as the original message. Also using  ( ||  ) would allow the possibility of 
lengthening the message with other data until a collision is found. [13] There have been 
suggestions to use the algorithm      |  |   , possibly with two different keys, but this 
also has been shown to have possible security issues. [14] Using two hashes one inside 
the other makes it very hard to find a collision. 
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6.7 Random Numbers 
6.7.1 Random Number Generation 
Cryptography relies heavily on random numbers. The keys generated to secure data 
must be very hard for others to guess or generate, which is why so called true random 
numbers should be used. Usually this is not feasible and algorithms have been invented 
to produce pseudo-random numbers. The main difference between true and pseudo-
random number generators is that the former uses some inherently random source as a 
seed for the number generation whereas the latter uses mathematical algorithms. 
The properties for random number generators are: 
 Efficiency: how many random numbers you can get from the generator in a specific 
time [8] 
 Determinism: how easily can the sequence of numbers be repeated [8] 
 Periodicity: how many numbers can you get from the generator before they repeat 
themselves [8] 
6.7.2 Pseudo-Random Number Generators 
Pseudo-random number generators are efficient, since they only rely on a mathematical 
formula. They can generate huge amounts of random numbers, but they are determinis-
tic, since they rely on a fixed algorithm and seed values. They are also periodic and will 
repeat the same numbers after a certain amount of numbers produced. [8] 
6.7.3 True Random Number Generators 
True random number generators usually have poor efficiency, since they need an exter-
nal source which is sampled. There can only be a certain amount of random data sam-
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pled per time period. The reason why they are still preferred is because they are com-
pletely nondeterministic and aperiodic. This means that they cannot be guessed and 
even if you took billions of numbers, the sequence you get will never repeat itself. [8] 
The sources for true random numbers can include the key typing or mouse movements 
of a computer user. These sources are not really truly random and don’t produce data at 
all times, so they are not always useful. Also in server systems there are no users to 
actually generate data to use. [8] 
More usable sources are, for example, atmospheric noise and radioactive materials. The 
decay of radioactive sources is completely unpredictable, so the detectors will get signals 
at truly random times. These signals can then be used to generate random numbers. [8] 
Some computers have processors that include an analog circuit that inherently produces 
noise, which is amplified and used as a source for random numbers. This way it is pos-
sible to generate a better randomness than would be feasible with just mathematical 
algorithms. One of these systems is Intel’s Ivy Bridge. 
6.7.4 Ivy Bridge RNG 
The RNG in Ivy Bridge consists of a self-oscillating digital circuit with feedback. The cir-
cuit has two latches which are in a metastable state and will output 0 or 1 depending on 
the thermal noise in the system. It is capable of working around 3GHz frequency, which 
means it can produce 3 billion random bits per second. [9] 
These bits are fed into another system working at 800MHz, which collects them into 
256bit random numbers. These numbers are subjected to a “health check” that deter-
mines whether the randomness is good enough. Tests count the appearance of certain 
bit sequences in the number (for example, the number of 1s) and if the value is not within 
a certain range, the number is discarded and a new one is taken. About 99% of numbers 
will pass the test. After the test there are some more processing, testing and reseeding 
before the actual number is presented to the requesting application. [9] 
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Intel claims the RNG to have at least 0.5 bits of entropy per bit, which was tested inde-
pendently. [9] This means that the generated random numbers have at least half the 
randomness of a truly random source. 
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7 Implementation 
7.1 Platform 
The two-factor authentication system was implemented in two parts: a server system 
and mobile client applications. The server system was implemented using Microsoft’s 
ASP.NET MVC framework in C# language to integrate with the existing system. The 
mobile client applications were implemented with Java for Android and Swift for iOS de-
vices. 
The server side system can be adopted to work on any authentication method since it is 
not tied to a specific framework. It is used as a secondary part after the regular password 
authentication and is therefore completely separate. The only thing needed is for the 
server-side system to keep track of the success of password authentication and invoke 
the one-time password system before actually letting the user in. 
The mobile applications are implemented so that they work on a large variety of Android 
and iOS devices. The functions needed for cryptography are available from very early 
versions of these platforms so in practice all devices currently in use should be able to 
use the application. Also due to the reason for the whole system being security it is not 
advisable to keep very old mobile operating systems in use.  
7.2 Chosen Method 
The chosen method was time-based one-time password as defined in RFC 6238 [3] but 
substituting the use of the possibly insecure SHA-1 algorithm with SHA-256 and without 
any master secret. Also the truncation method was modified to take into account the 
larger output size of the hash function. No global master key is defined so if a single 
secret key were to be disclosed, other keys would not be affected. 
The password is derived from a shared secret K, and a time value T that are fed into an 
SHA-256 HMAC algorithm. The value T is derived from the current UNIX time by dividing 
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the value with a predetermined time constant D. This constant will determine the time 
window in which the algorithm will provide the same value before moving on to the next. 
Having a large D will cause the password to remain the same for a longer time and also 
affects the time the server will accept the password. The constant D was chosen to be 
20 seconds since that is a reasonable time for the user to input the password and it to 
be sent to the server. 
When the server validates the password, the same method is used, but there is also a 
tunable constant C that determines how many past time slots are accepted. Since the 
password is valid within a discrete D second timeslots, the user may have received the 
password at D-1 seconds and the validity period has passed before the password is sent 
to the server. Therefore the server will check for the current password at the time of 
receiving and also C previous timeslots. 
Having a large C will allow the user to input the password at a longer timeframe and also 
accounts for slightly non-synchronized clocks, but will allow for an eavesdropper to use 
the same password for a longer time. Therefore the constant C was chosen to be 1 to 
allow on average D*1.5 seconds of time to send the code to server, i.e. 30 seconds. 
The 256 bit result of the HMAC algorithm is fed into a truncation method, which will result 
in a 32 bit output. This value is further truncated into an 8 number integer code ready to 
be used. This truncation is done so that the code is easier for the user to enter into the 
system. If we used the whole 256bit result the user would need to enter a longer or more 
complicated code into the system making it more cumbersome to use. 
7.3 Requirements 
The RFC 6238 [3] defines seven requirements for the algorithm: 
1. Both sides must be able to derive the current UNIX time. As long as both the 
server and the mobile device have their clocks synchronized to a reliable source 
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they can determine this. Also by using the D and C values slight differences be-
tween the server and the mobile device clocks do not interfere with the password 
generation notably. 
2. Both sides must share the secret or have an algorithm to generate it. In this im-
plementation the secret key is shared manually from the mobile device to the 
server so both have access to it. 
3. The algorithm must use HOTP as a key building block. The algorithm is directly 
derived from RFCs 4226 and 6238 and uses HOTP as the basis. 
4. Both sides must have the same constant D. The value of D is hard-coded and 
the same on both sides. 
5. There must be a unique secret for each provider. The mobile application gener-
ates a new random secret key for each user and system. There is a probability 
of the secret key being the same, but the probability is about one in 1.46∗10   
due to the random secret being a 160bit value. 
6. The keys should be randomly generated or derived using key derivation algo-
rithms. The implementation uses platform-provided random number functions 
that have been designed to be used in cryptographic systems. 
7. The key should be protected against unauthorized access and usage. The secret 
key is encrypted using an unknown length PIN code and there is no way to de-
termine the secret key without knowing the PIN code. 
Therefore all requirements placed by the RFC 6238 have been met and the algorithm 
can be assumed to be secure and implemented in the way intended. 
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7.4 Implementation in Short 
The client application generates a secret key by using cryptographically strong random 
numbers. The secret is shown to the user in base32 encoded form for convenience and 
the user saves this secret key on the server via an encrypted channel. The secret key is 
saved on the client encrypted with a user-defined numerical PIN code. The secret key is 
never shown to the user again on the client application and the application does not know 
the PIN code. This way if the application data storage is compromised, it contains only 
opaque encrypted data and there is no possibility to determine which PIN code should 
be used to decrypt it and retrieve the secret key. 
When the user requires a one-time password to access the server they input the PIN 
code and the secret key is decrypted and used for calculating the time-limited code. The 
code is then input to the server which verifies the validity by calculating the same values 
with their copy of the secret key. 
7.5 Used Algorithms 
The algorithms used in the implementation are well-known and nothing new was in-
vented. This was to make sure there are no weak links due to badly designed algorithms. 
7.5.1 Base32 Algorithm 
The base32 algorithm converts input binary data into human readable text using 32 al-
phanumeric characters. This means that for every five bits of input data one eight bit 
character will be produced, making the output data 60% larger than the input. The char-
acter set used is 0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ. The character set specifi-
cally skips certain letters like O and I due to the possibility of a mix-up with numbers 0 
and 1 as well as letters L and U as unneeded to reach 32 characters. 
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If the input data size is not divisible by 5 bits zero bits are appended. The implementation 
could also add a checksum into the output to make sure the data is input correctly but in 
this case this was not considered important. 
7.5.2 Truncation Method 
The truncation is used to convert the resulting 256bit hash result into a more user-friendly 
one-time password. The truncation method in the RFC 6238 [3] is meant to be used for 
160bit values so I altered it to allow the usage of the whole 256bit value. The algorithm 
uses a part of the hash result as an offset to the hash to take a 32bit part of it. Using it 
this way ensures that the result is as random as it can be and doesn’t make it easier to 
determine. 
Example of the algorithm: [Figure 1] 
1. The 256bit hash value received from previous steps: 
cd4dda3993d5e1756c65f357da2c320fbfd2856107254f1f6499d0c72acff68c 
2. Take the four lowest bits of the first byte (cd) which is d or 13 
3. Take the three lowest bits of the tenth byte (65) which is 5 
4. Add these values together to get 18 
5. Use this as an offset to the hash and take four bytes starting from position 18, 
getting the value d2856107 or 3531956487 
6. Take modulo 100000000 of this number to get 31956487. This is the one-time 
password calculated from this hash 
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Figure 1 Deriving the one-time password from the hash value 
Since the algorithm uses a 4bit and a 3bit number to calculate the offset the possible 
range is 0-23. Four bytes are taken so the possible byte range is 0-27. This means that 
the last four bytes of the hash are never used in the formation of the one-time pass-
word. This has some effect on the randomness of the result, but it is not assumed to be 
that significant. 
7.5.3 Key Generation 
The client generates the secret key using the following algorithm [Figure 2]: 
1. A 160bit cryptographically secure random number N is generated on the client 
via system provided functions (java.security.SecureRandom on Android, 
SecRandomCopyBytes on iOS).  
2. A user-provided numeric PIN code of user-chosen length is run through HMAC-
SHA256 algorithm with a predefined constant key to produce a 256bit number P 
3. The number N is xor’ed with number P to produce the saved secret S 
4. The user is shown a base32 encoded version of the number N to store into the 
server 
cd4dda3993d5e1756c65f357da2c320fbfd2856107254f1f6499d0c72acff68c 
18 
31956487 
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5. The saved secret S is stored on the client device 
 
Figure 2 Key generation algorithm 
7.5.4 One-Time Password Generation 
When a one-time password is required the following algorithm is used: [Figure 3] 
1. The saved secret S is retrieved from the client storage 
2. A user-provided numeric PIN code is run through HMAC-SHA256 algorithm with 
a predefined constant key to produce a 256bit number P 
3. The saved secret S is xor’ed with number P to restore the secret key N 
4. Current UNIX timestamp T is acquired from a synchronized clock 
5. The timestamp T is divided by the constant D to produce the value O 
160bit random 
number N 
User defined PIN HMAC SHA256 
S 
256bit 
number P 
XOR 
Saved 
secret 
Base32 
Show to 
user 
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6. The secret key N is combined with the 32bit little-endian representation of the 
value O and run through HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to get a 256bit value X 
7. An offset F is calculated by taking the four lowest bits of the first byte from X and 
adding them to the three lowest bits of the tenth byte from X 
8. A 32bit value Y is constructed by taking four consecutive bytes in big-endian form 
from X starting from byte F 
9. The final shown password W is formed by taking the modulo 100000000 of value 
Y causing the output to be an eight number string 
 
Figure 3 One-time password generation 
7.6 User Experience 
The mobile application implemented has the possibility to create a new one-time pass-
word provider, get a new password and delete an existing password provider. 
Current 
time T 
User defined 
PIN 
HMAC 
SHA256 
256bit 
number P 
XOR 
Secret key 
N 
Saved 
secret 
Divide by D 
Time value 
O 
HMAC 
SHA256 
Truncate Password 
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7.6.1 Creating a One-Time Password 
1. User selects Create New Password 
2. User gives the password a name and a PIN code [Picture 4] 
 
3. The application presents the secret code for the user [Picture 5] 
 
4. The user inputs the secret code to the server via a web page  
7.6.2 Logging in Procedure 
1. User logs into the server providing their username and password 
2. The server asks for the one-time password 
3. User launches the client application, selects the desired password and inputs 
their PIN number 
Picture 4 creating a new password provider 
Picture 5 Presenting the secret code to the user 
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4. The client application shows the 8-number password [Picture 6] 
 
5. User sends the one-time password to the server 
6. Server generates one-time passwords based on the same secret key and prede-
fined time values D  and C and compares the generated passwords to the user-
given password 
7. Depending on the validity of the PIN code and the time taken to send the pass-
word to the server the user may or may not be allowed to log in 
7.6.3 Deleting Password 
When the user wants to delete a password provider they select the password, choose 
delete and confirm the action. The operation is irreversible immediately and all infor-
mation of the password are removed from the device. 
7.7 Server Implementation 
When a user logs in their username and password are first checked. Then if a two-factor 
authentication is enabled the server will prompt the user to input the one-time password. 
After receiving the password the server creates a password by itself based on the same 
secret key and D value and checks if it matches. If it does, the user is logged in. If not, 
Picture 6 Retrieving the one-time password with PIN code 
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then C previous time values are used to create passwords and if any of those matches 
the user is logged in. If none of these match the user is presented with an error message 
and the invalid login is recorded in the server logs. 
If the user inputs a wrong password too many times the account is disabled. This pre-
vents the attacked trying more than a couple of PIN codes on the account. 
7.8 Storing Data 
The secret key is stored using encryption based on a free-length PIN code on the mobile 
device. The secret key is exclusive-or’ed with an SHA-256 HMAC of the PIN code. This 
means that the stored data is an opaque binary blob and there is no way to determine 
what the PIN code is, for example using known plaintext attack. This adds to the security 
since the attacker cannot run through all possible PIN codes and get an indication on 
which one is correct. 
On the server the secret key is stored in the database and the database settings define 
if the data are encrypted on disk or not. When requesting the key it is transmitted in plain 
text so the connection to the database should be encrypted. 
The implementation also doesn’t take into account the theoretical possibility of accessing 
the memory of the server or the mobile device directly and finding the secret key that 
way. This is due to the fact that if an attacker can do that on the target device they can 
also probably read the information directly from other sources and security has already 
been compromised. 
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8 Security 
8.1 Algorithm Security 
According to the RFC 4226 [2] the original algorithm with counter has the probability of 
one in 999,760 of guessing the correct number in one go. With knowledge of previous 
values and possibility to try older values also the probability of guessing increases by the 
product of these numbers. 
It is also shown that brute force is the best possible attack against this algorithm. There 
are no smarter attacks against the algorithm. Even if an attacker would see 2   authen-
tication attempts (which would take an impossible long time to gather) they still wouldn’t 
have any better success at predicting the next password. 
With the modified algorithm the number of possible keys has been increased by a factor 
of 100, so the probability is also decreased by the same factor. The values for possible 
previous keys accepted was set as two, so the probability of finding the correct key is 
close to one in 5 ∗10 . Since the server also closes the account after too many wrong 
attempts on the one-time password there is not much possibility of using brute force to 
determine the password. 
8.2 Server Security 
The server stores the secret keys in the database without encryption, since the database 
must be secured and a breach of security on the server would in any case provide infor-
mation about the encryption of the keys. If the database security cannot be ensured, the 
keys can also be saved encrypted and the encryption key will be stored with the appli-
cation. Then the application server security has to be ensured. 
Using a typical lockdown of user accounts after n invalid password attempts for both the 
regular password and the one-time password will make sure the attacker cannot try out 
passwords until a proper one is found. 
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8.3 Client Security 
The shared secret key is generated on the client application. The client application has 
no connection to any network and the shared secret is input by hand into the server 
system. This way there is no possibility of eavesdropping on the connection between the 
mobile device and the server. There is, however, a possibility for eavesdropping between 
the browser used and the server. Since this channel will be secured with industry stand-
ard security measures (SSL, TLS), the possibility of acquiring the key is minimal. 
To further minimize the possibility of eavesdropping the shared secret key can of course 
be sent via other methods than using a browser, if required. 
Since the secret key is stored as an opaque binary blob and no information of the PIN 
code is stored the attacker cannot determine which PIN code of the infinite number of 
possibilities is the correct one. 
Since a platform provided random number generators and encryption implementations 
are used there is very little possibility of an error in the implementation of these. There 
might be an error but this is deemed very improbable since the functions have been 
thoroughly tested and many times the implementations are public. 
8.3.1 Storage 
The client stores only the user-given name of the password and the encrypted secret 
code. These cannot be used to determine the actual secret key or the PIN code even if 
they were compromised. 
On Android devices the data are stored in the internal memory which is encrypted and 
by default no other application can access the data stored by this application. On iOS 
devices the internal memory is encrypted by default and also only accessible by the 
application itself. 
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IOS devices are not regularly jailbroken, so the possibility of getting data out of the stor-
age is quite small. Android devices are regularly rooted or include applications that have 
access to the data. Since the keys are encrypted without storing the encryption key, even 
direct access to them will not reveal the actual keys to the attacker. 
8.3.2 PIN Code 
The PIN code is a free-length numeric code used to encrypt the secret key in storage. 
Since there is no fixed length for the code, the amount of possible codes is very large, 
practically infinite. Every PIN code input is accepted as a valid code and a one-time 
password is output in constant time. This way there is no possibility to guess the PIN 
code from responses or error messages. 
8.3.3 Apple Touch ID 
The application will not use Apple’s Touch ID fingerprint technology, since this would 
actually reduce security. The fingerprint locking does not provide any encryption or real 
security, only information whether the fingerprint or PIN code input is valid. Therefore the 
secret key would have to be saved unencrypted and might be possible to extract from 
the device. 
8.4 Randomness of the Password 
Since the truncate algorithm includes a 32bit value modulo 100,000,000 there is a slight 
bias towards certain numbers. A 32bit value can have a value between 0 and 
4,294,967,295 which in modulo 100,000,000 is 94,967,295. This means that values be-
tween 0 and 94,967,295 can occur 43 times (probability of one in 99,882,960) whereas 
values between 94,967,296 and 99,999,999 can occur 42 times (probability of one in 
102,261,126). This bias is very small and doesn’t play a role in helping break the pass-
word. 
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Considering this implementation has an eight number one-time password compared to 
the six number password used in the RFC 4226 [2] the bias is a lot smaller. 
8.5 General Security 
There is a possibility for someone else to log in during the same timeframe using the 
same username, password and one-time password during the time period the one-time 
password is valid. This is highly unlikely and if this would be perceived as a possible 
threat the server can be easily modified to accept the password only once by storing the 
recently used passwords for the duration of the acceptance period. Then the first one to 
log in using a certain time-limited password would invalidate that password from being 
used again and the attacker would have to acquire a new password. 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 General Conclusions 
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate two-factor authentication methods and implement 
one of them for real-world use. Several authentication methods were evaluated and ex-
plained and a suitable version was implemented for a live environment. The method en-
hances the security of the system by not allowing anyone to log on with just a static 
password. 
The time-based one-time password mechanism is simple to implement and very efficient 
in adding another layer of security on top of a regular username and password authenti-
cation. It provides the possibility to mitigate the possibility of an attacker getting hold of 
the user’s password and accessing sensitive information. 
The implementation succeeded in adding a second layer of security on the system while 
causing minimal extra work for the users. The mobile application is simple and easy to 
use and runs on the devices the users carry around every day already. There was no 
need for specific user training since the users learned to use the system by written in-
structions. 
9.2 Possible Enhancements 
There is a possibility that an attacker would get a hold of the one-time password the user 
uses to log in and would use it to log in to the system. This could be easily circumvented 
by implementing a recent one-time password memory in the server that automatically 
blocks any duplicate use. In this case it wasn’t seen as an important addition and 
would’ve added complexity to the system so it wasn’t implemented. 
This implementation also restricts the user to only use a single device to produce the 
passwords. It would be possible to modify the server to store multiple secret keys and 
try all of them for acceptable codes. This also would’ve added complexity to the system 
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and effectively reduced the amount of possible codes since several combinations would 
have been accepted. Usually the secret key is created by the server and set to the mobile 
devices by the user so there can be several devices with the same key producing the 
same one-time password without reducing security. 
At the moment the server tells the user if the regular username/password combination is 
correct before requesting the one-time password. If the server opaquely accepted any 
regular password and only after getting the one-time password gave a response the se-
curity would be a bit better. The attacker couldn’t be sure that the regular password is 
correct and couldn’t use any social attacks to administrators or other personnel, for ex-
ample to get the secret key changed to their key by presenting the correct username and 
password combination in some recovery system. 
The truncation algorithm leaves the last four bytes of the hash unused. It would be simple 
to add another two-bit value from some part of the hash to the offset to make its range 
be 0-27 which would mean we would use the whole byte range of 0-31. 
To conclude, this thesis presented the requirements for information systems containing 
personal medical information, the threats that are present and a method to implement a 
two-factor authentication to enhance the security of such systems. 
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